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Robert J. Dostal 
Bryn Mawr College 
 
GADAMERIAN HERMENEUTICS AND IRONY: 
BETWEEN STRAUSS AND DERRIDA 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a well-known and well-founded, if somewhat oversimple, distinction between the 
hermeneutics of trust (or good will) and the hermeneutics of suspicion.  Commentators on 
Gadamer, I among them, have counted Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a “hermeneutics of trust” and 
contrasted it with the hermeneutics of suscipion.1  As is well-known, this latter phrase, 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” was coined by Paul Ricoeur in his book on Freud.2  The 19th 
century masters of such a hermeneutics are Freud and Marx.  It goes without saying that they 
have had much influence on contemporary hermeneutics.  Gadamer himself devoted an essay to 
the hermeneutics of suspicion, which, for whatever reason, Gadamer did not publish in German.3    
In this essay Gadamer names Nietzsche as the “inaugurator” of radical suspicion, whose “most 
striking instances” are to be found in the critique of ideology and psychoanalysis.  Though there 
is an important distinction, which I do not find Gadamer anywhere recognizing, between the 
Enlightenment and scientific approach of Marx and Freud and what might be called the anti-
Enlightenment approach of Nietzsche, it is the case that all three are unmaskers in their own way.  
In this paper I would like to discuss irony and ask whether the interpretation of irony calls for a 
kind of unmasking and how Gadamer’s hermeneutics of trust deals with irony.  It is noteworthy 
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that often, when Gadamer comments on irony, he mentions Leo Strauss.  Further, irony is an 
aspect of the challenge to the hermeneutics of trust by the hermeneutics of suspicion that 
motivated a development in Gadamer’s hermeneutics which is evidenced in his important essay, 
“Text and Interpretation.”  Finally, as a reader of and commentator on Plato, Gadamer often has 
to deal with Socrates’ irony.  How much is the Platonic dialogue a model of the hermeneutical 
dialogue of the reader with the text that Gadamer wishes to foster?  Does Socrates and his irony 
evince trust and good will toward Euthyphro or Anytus or Thrasymachus, for example? 
 
2. Gadamerian Hermeneutics:  A Hermeneutics of Trust and Good 
Will 
       While it may be a contentious claim to assert that the only appropriate hermeneutics is a 
hermeneutics of trust and good will, I do not think it a contentious claim that Gadamer advocates 
such a hermeneutics and defends such a claim.  In short, for Gadamer, what hermeneutics is 
about is understanding (das Verstehen).  What anyone is attempting to do in the hermeneutical 
situation is to understand the other, to understand the text.  In this attempt to understand, one is 
trying to come to an understanding (Verständigung) with the other.  Gadamer offers us the model 
of the dialogue.  A basic presupposition of the dialogue, within which we attempt to come to an 
understanding, is good will toward the other.  In the essay, “Text and Interpretation,” Gadamer 
writes:  “Thus for a written conversation basically the same fundamental condition obtains as for 
an oral exchange.  Both partners must have the good will to try to understand one another.”4  
This “good will” requires respect for the other.  In addition to this, it calls for humility.  Genuine 
listening or careful reading asks that we let the text or our partner in dialogue to speak to us and 
possibly correct us. He writes in a late retrospective of his work that  
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its [hermeneutic philosophy’s] modesty consists in the fact that there is no higher 
principle (Prinzip) than this holding oneself open to the conversation.  This 
means, however, constantly recognizing in advance the possibility that your 
partner is right, even recognizing the possible superiority of your partner.5  
Though it might seem a stretch to speak about the “ethics” of hermeneutics—Gadamer never 
uses this phrase—Gadamer clearly sees trust, humility, modesty, fidelity and carefulness as the 
hermeneutic virtues.6   At the core of this is what Donald Davidson calls “the principle of 
charity” and Jonathan Lear, “the principle of humanity.”7  While Anglo-American philosophers 
like to think of this question in terms of ‘principles,’—witness Davidson and Lear-- it is more a 
matter of virtue or virtues for Gadamer (though he does on occasion, though rarely, use the term 
“Prinzip,” as just cited).  Virtues are appropriate of a discipline; principles of a method.  Recall 
the concluding line of Truth and Method:  what method cannot achieve, discipline (or a habit of 
mind) can provide--a warrant for truth. 
 As I have just noted and is well-known, Gadamer develops his account of the 
interpretation of a text on the model of a dialogue or conversation between two speakers.  There 
is a limit to the way a text can act as a partner in a dialogue.  In a certain extended sense, the text 
can respond and answer questions, but, as Plato has Socrates point out in the Phaedrus, texts 
quite literally say the same thing over and over again.  It is with regard to the written text (and 
not the dialogical partner of oral speech) that Gadamer, I would suggest, advocates the 
submission of the reader to the text.  “Submission” is my word and not Gadamer’s.  But 
Gadamer does use the language of “service” and “subordination.”  For example, in “Text and 
Interpretation,” Gadamer writes, with regard to the interpretation of written texts, that “The 
interpreter has no other function than to disappear completely into the achievement of full 
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harmony in understanding.  The discourse of the interpreter is therefore not itself a text; rather it 
serves a text.”(TI 41)   In “On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth,” we find:  
“Now it is not only the poetic word that is ‘autonomous’ in the sense that we subordinate 
ourselves to it and concentrate all our efforts upon it as ‘as a text.’”8  This notion of 
disappearance, subordination, and service is not something unique to this essay; nor is it a late 
development in Gadamer’s thought.  In what might be called the proto-version of Truth and 
Method, the essay entitled “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” which I have already 
cited and which was first presented in French in Louvain in 1957, Gadamer writes not of 
“disappearance,” but of “effacement”:  “There is no intention [in the interpretation of texts] to 
place the realization of the text aside from the text itself.  On the contrary, the ultimate ideal of 
appropriateness seems to be total self-effacement because the meaning [Verständnis] of the text 
has become self-evident.”9  In Truth and Method Gadamer provides the criterion for the right 
interpretation—disappearance:  “Paradoxically, an interpretation is right when it is capable of 
disappearing in this way.  And yet at the same time it [the interpretation] must be expressed as 
something that is supposed to disappear.”10  In sum, the interpreter, the mediator, humbly effaces 
himself or herself before the text, ideally disappearing—or doing the interpretative work such 
that it seems that there is no mediation, no interpretation.  The interpretive work is done so well, 
no one notices it.   
 This view of the role of the interpreter and the interpretation obviously runs contrary to 
the hermeneutical views of critics like Harold Bloom, for whom a “strong” interpretation would 
replace the text interpreted.11  The critic would replace the author.  On this view, the distinction 
between interpretation and text, or between critic and author, does not hold.  Richard Rorty, in 
this sense, is right to call Gadamer a “weak textualist” and not a “strong” textualist.12  For Rorty, 
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Bloom, Derrida and others, the interpreter’s relation to the text is better characterized in terms of 
the will to power rather than humility, trust, respect, and good will.  From this perspective the 
Gadamerian view is either naïve or a ploy of the will to power. 
 From Gadamer’s perspective, the mistake that such a hermeneutics makes is to make 
paramount in the hermeneutical situation power rather than truth.  Such a hermeneutics focuses 
on the subjectivity of the interpreter or the power balance (or imbalance) of the participants in 
conversation.  This certainly plays a role, according to Gadamer—but a secondary role.  What is 
primary for Gadamer is whatever it is that is under discussion, whatever it is that the text is 
about, the matter at hand, die Sache.  What provides the basis for any conversation is what it is 
about.  And, briefly stated, whatever it is that is under consideration (even if we are talking about 
ourselves) stands in the world, a world that we have in common.  These hermeneutic virtues 
exercised together in our common world make solidarity possible—an important theme in 
Gadamer’s work. 
 The primacy of die Sache renders authorship secondary.  To say that it is secondary is not 
to say that it is irrelevant (or “dead”).  Gadamer clearly recognizes what rhetoric, ancient, 
medieval, modern and contemporary, has always recognized, namely, that any speech, written or 
oral, has a number of aspects including the following four major ones (sometimes we have to 
remind ourselves of the obvious):  
1) the speaker or author,  
2) the listener or reader,  
3) what is spoken or written about, and 
4) the way that the speech is presented or written. 
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Each of these aspects is more or less complex.  Gadamer provides a contemporary version of 
Plato’s double move in the Phaedrus of underscoring the positive importance of rhetoric and 
criticizing those rhetoricians who ignored the third aspect, the truth aspect, on behalf of the other 
aspects. 13  He also would have us recognize, just as Plato does in the Phaedrus, the difference 
between written and oral speech, though both of these exhibit, in their own way, each of these 
four dimensions. 
 So, one version of the hermeneutics of suspicion is the consideration of any conversation 
as a struggle for power, for dominance.  Another related but indirect version of this hermeneutics 
can be found in psychoanalysis and in what the Germans call the critique of ideology 
(Ideologiekritik).  These modes of discourse are quintessentially Enlightenment modes of 
discourse which take a step back from everyday discourse and behavior and criticize it from the 
perspective of science.  Both modes of discourse might be said, in a colloquial German 
expression, to display themselves as Besserwisserei. That is, these scientific modes of discourse 
“know better” what the speaker is saying than the speaker, “know better” than the patient, “know 
better” than the everyday political discourse, “know better” than folk wisdom and ways.  In the 
psychoanalytic situation the patient presumably willing submits herself or himself for therapy 
and psychoanalysis.  Authority and power are exerted by the analyst and there may well be 
resistance but the paradigm of this situation is not the same as the more straightforward struggle 
for power we have just discussed.   
 Gadamer makes the case against psychoanalysis and Ideologiekritik as models of 
interpretive practice generally, as we all know, primarily in his exchange with Habermas at the 
end of the 1960’s.  He returns briefly to this same theme in the late essay, “Wort und Bild—‘so 
wahr, so seiend’,” when he comments on Susan Sontag’s essay “Against Interpretation,” which 
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he says touches a “sore point” (wunden Punkt) concerning the “scientific interpretation of poetry 
and art.”14  He writes here that scientific methodology for interpretation objectivizes and brings 
the object of interpretation into too much light (überhellen).  Sontag, in this essay, distinguishes 
between an older “respectful” style of interpretation and a modern “excavating” kind of 
interpretation.15  Her polemic is against the latter.  Her point is much like that of Nietzsche in his 
preface to The Gay Science where he praises the Greeks for their superficiality and urges the 
reader to “stop courageously at the surface.”16  Nietzsche here says further that “we no longer 
believe that truth remains the truth when the veils are withdrawn.”  This defense of superficiality 
and critique of unveiling separates Nietzsche, a critic of modernity and the Enlightenment, from 
the interpretive work of Marx and Freud.  How much Nietzsche’s genealogical work and exposé, 
for example, of Christian humility as a form of the will to power follows his own injunction for 
superficiality is a question we cannot pursue here.  Nietzsche’s strategy of genealogical 
unmasking runs counter to his injunction against unveiling. 
 There are limits to the analogy of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marx’s Ideologiekritik, 
but it is interesting to note that the young Habermas made much of the parallel between these 
two modes of discourse.  Central to the much discussed exchange and disagreement between 
Habermas and Gadamer in the late 60’s was precisely the model of psychoanalysis for 
hermeneutics and Ideologiekritik.  As you will surely recall, Habermas in his Inaugural Lecture, 
embraced Gadamerian hermeneutics as providing the rules for determining “the possible 
meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural sciences.”17  In the same lecture, Habermas 
claims that psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology go beyond hermeneutics and are 
transformative and liberating in ways that hermeneutics is not.  Gadamer’s response, in short, 
was to point out the asymmetry and disequilibrium between the position of the analyst and the 
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patient.  Gadamer asks how the analyst might give up his mastery of the situation and participate 
as a partner in a conversation.18  Gadamer also suggests that Habermas dogmatically privileges 
the neurotic in making psychoanalysis a paradigm of the highest form of discourse and the union 
of theory and practice.  In the course of Habermas’ development he comes to accept Gadamer’s 
criticism in this regard.  He drops the psychoanalytic situation as a paradigm for emancipatory 
discourse and develops a model of an ideal and distortion free speech situation in which all are 
partners in dialogue. 
 
3. The Difficulty of Irony 
Gadamer, in one of the very few places that he discusses irony, writes, half-seriously, that “it 
has been said, and probably not unjustly, that to interpret something as irony often is nothing but 
a gesture of despair on the part of the interpreter.”(TI 38)  Put simply, to speak ironically is to 
say something other than one means.   How can Gadamer’s hermeneutics of good will and trust 
come to terms with irony?  If we are not suspicious with regard to the text or the other speaker, 
are we not likely to be duped by irony?  Won’t we miss it?  Is not a hermeneutics of trust naïve 
with regard to irony?  And does not this naivete expose the weakness and inappropriateness of 
such a hermeneutic?  Further, how can Gadamer point to Plato as presenting us with a model of 
dialogue (as he frequently does) when the major figure in the conversation is so often ironical.  
Does Gadamer’s interpretative practice in reading Plato display trust?  Can Gadamer’s Platonism 
and his hermeneutics be reconciled?   
As noted earlier in this paper, the center of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is an account of 
understanding (Verstehen) according to which we attempt to come to an understanding 
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(Verständigung) with the other, be it a text or a dialogical partner.  In addition to Plato, there is a 
second moment in the history of philosophy for which irony is extremely important and which is 
also important for Gadamer—the moment of German romanticism, especially the work of 
Friedrich Schlegel.  It is telling that one of F. Schlegel’s most important writings on irony is 
entitled:  “Über die Unverständlichkeit”—literally, “On Non-understandability” or, as it has been 
translated, “On Incomprehensibility.”19  In short, what makes a text incomprehensible for 
Schlegel is irony.  How does a Gadamerian hermeneutic withstand the challenge of irony and the 
hermeneutics of German romanticism? 
Gadamer rarely discusses irony in the context of his hermeneutics, but as I will show, it has a 
self-acknowledged importance for Gadamer much greater than the attention he bestows on it.20  
He mentions irony only once in Truth and Method; and it is in a footnote. (TM 295)  The context 
for this footnote is a discussion of the conditions of understanding, the conditions for properly 
interpreting speech in the second part of Part II which is entitled:  “Elements of a theory of 
hermeneutic experience.”  Among these conditions, the first and primary condition (“erster 
aller”) is “one’s own fore-understanding” (“das Vorverständnis”).  This fore-understanding or 
pre-understanding “comes from being concerned with the same subject (Sache).”  Gadamer 
clarifies this by adding here:  “Here again we see that understanding means, primarily, to 
understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to isolate and understand another’s 
meaning as such.”(TM 294)  This fore-understanding is a fore-conception (Vorgriff) of 
completeness, that is, a preconception of the whole of which whatever is before our attention is a 
part.  The part is understood in terms of the whole.  In coming to terms with any part, we are 
always projecting the whole within which it stands.   
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In the text proper Gadamer does not qualify, complicate, or express any reservations 
about this projection, nor about the primacy of understanding the thing which is spoken 
about.  But in a footnote to this account, Gadamer does so qualify and complicate.  He 
writes (footnote 224):  
There is one exception to this anticipation of completeness, namely the case of 
writing that is presenting something in disguise, e.g., a roman de clef.  This 
presents one of the most difficult hermeneutic problems (cf. the interesting 
remarks by Leo Strauss in Persecution and the Art of Writing).  This exceptional 
hermeneutical case is of special significance, in that it goes beyond interpretation 
of meaning in the same way as when historical source criticism goes back behind 
the tradition.  Although the task here is not a historical, but a hermeneutical one, it 
can be performed only by using understanding of the subject matter as a key to 
discover what is behind the disguise—just as in conversation we understand irony 
to the extent to which we are in agreement with the other person on the subject 
matter. (TM 294-295) 
 
In other words, if a text does not mean what it says but means something else, we then need 
to go “back behind” the text “to discover what is behind the disguise.”  We need to unmask the 
text, to find the deeper meaning behind the surface meaning.  This seems very like the 
hermeneutical task that psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology set for themselves.  In this 
brief comment, Gadamer considers irony to be analogous to, but not necessarily the same as, the 
roman de clef.  This might seem to suggest that irony provides an example of a text that is 
untrustworthy much like neurotic rationalization and ideological propaganda.  If texts can prove 
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to be untrustworthy, what then for a hermeneutics of trust?  Gadamer is here acknowledging the 
importance of this question when he writes here, as I have cited, that “this presents one of the 
most difficult hermeneutic problems.” 
We might be led to think that if the text does not say what it means, that we need to concern 
ourselves with what the author or speaker ironically means—that is, that the intention of the 
author would become primary in this context.  But note that Gadamer insists 1) that such texts 
are the exception (Ausnahmefall), and 2) that the key to the unmasking of irony is our 
understanding of the subject matter.  Even here die Sache is primary.  In our understanding of the 
subject matter we find ourselves in agreement with the speaker or author and with the ironic 
meaning of the text. 
In this footnote just cited, Gadamer mentions Leo Strauss and his book Persecution and the 
Art of Writing, which, for Gadamer, is both enlightening and problematic.  He takes up again the 
question of irony and Strauss’s treatment of it in “Supplement I: Hermeneutics and Historicism” 
which he adds to the second edition of Truth and Method (1965).21  Here he reiterates his claim 
that “even Plato’s artistic irony can be understood only by someone who shares his knowledge of 
the subject matter (as is the case with all irony).”(TM 538)  As I will discuss later in this essay, 
Gadamer here goes on to criticize Strauss and the Straussians for taking the concern for irony too 
far in their interpretations of Plato and other philosophers. 
It is only in the important and pivotal essay, “Truth and Interpretation” that Gadamer 
provides us a context within his hermeneutics by which we might understand irony.22  The essay 
is written both to develop some central themes of Truth and Method and to open a conversation 
with Jacques Derrida.  As we have noted, Gadamer develops his hermeneutics and his account of 
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understanding in large part on the basis of an analogy between conversation and the 
interpretation of texts.  In this address Gadamer wishes to recognize the limit of the analogy and 
to challenge Derrida.  Contra Derrida, everything is not to be considered a text.23  Also, we 
should recognize the distinction between spoken and written speech.  Further, even among fixed 
and written speeches, there are important distinctions to be made.  In short, all that is written is 
not, on Gadamer’s account, a text.  Here Gadamer distinguishes texts from three “oppositional 
forms,” that is, three forms of writing that appear in the form of a text but are not genuine texts.   
These are antitexts (Antitexte), pseudotexts (Pseudotexte), and pretexts (Prätexte).  The primary 
example of an antitext is a joke.  The dominant factor here, according to Gadamer, is the 
situation of the discourse which signals that the statement is to be taken as a joke and not 
seriously.  Outside that situation it is difficult to tell whether the statement is to be taken 
seriously or as a joke.  Outside that situation the joke is often not funny; the joke “cannot be 
repeated.”(TI 37)  Gadamer goes on to say that “basically, the same applies to another quite 
classical form of mutual agreement, namely, irony.”(TI 37)  It may seem surprising that 
Gadamer claims that the dissimulation of irony aims at solidarity, but Gadamer’s claim echoes 
the brief account of irony in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Bk IV) where Aristotle counts 
irony as one of the extremes for which the mean is truthfulness—and is thus a vice.  Yet the self-
deprecation of the ironist is attractive and noble inasmuch as it does not seek its own advantage 
and spares others the feeling of inferiority.24  The hermeneutic difficulty of dealing with irony 
and with such anti-texts occurs when there is a cultural distance from the text, temporal or spatial 
(cultural), such that the reader does not share or is unclear about this set of prior cultural 
understandings. 
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Let us skip over what Gadamer calls pseudotexts for which he gives no clear example.  He 
says that such writing provides “filler material” that need not be translated.  A third kind of non-
text is a pretext. It is under the title of “pretext” that Gadamer discusses ideology, dreams, and 
the psychopathology of everyday life.  Pretexts, he writes, “are texts that we interpret on the 
basis of something that is precisely what they do not mean.  What they mean, the apparent or 
surface meaning, is merely pretence, an excuse, behind which is concealed the ‘meaning.’”(TI 
39)  The appropriate mode of discourse in response to these is the critique of ideology and 
psychoanalysis which expose the pretence as pretence.  That is, Gadamer affirms an appropriate 
role for psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology.  He concludes his brief discussion of 
pretexts by saying:  “However, I believe it is a mistake to privilege these forms of distorted 
intelligibity, of neurotic derangement, as the normal case in textual interpretation.”(TI 40) 
Here Gadamer is distinguishing between irony as an antitext and ideological and neurotic 
texts as pretexts.  Irony, for Gadamer, relies on mutually understandable cultural givens.  Ironical 
texts demonstrate social solidarity.  Since what I am calling the “cultural givens” are unspoken, 
written irony is often difficult to interpret from a cultural distance of space and/or time.  But, 
nonetheless, irony is expressive of solidarity.  It is meant to be understood.   Ideological or 
neurotic speech, on the other hand, is expressive of the breakdown of solidarity, even if it 
appears or pretends to express solidarity.  It misleads or covers over.  Such speech, of course, 
calls for the critique of ideology or psychoanalysis.  Irony is accordingly dissimilar to ideology 
and rationalization. 
Gadamer’s criticism of Leo Strauss and, more sharply if somewhat vaguely, of the 
Straussians is that they sometimes take as paradigmatic for the writing of philosophy the 
necessity of hiding one’s views from the reading public because of the threat to one’s life.  What 
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begins with Strauss’s sensitive and persuasive reading of Socratic irony becomes a reading 
against the text—a reading of the text as a pretext.  Philosophical writing, on this model, is not 
ideological or neurotic but esoteric.  Gadamer does not explicitly refer to esoteric writing here, 
but it meets Gadamer’s definition of a pretext, that is, a text in which “something masked or 
disguised comes to expression.”(TI 39)  Such esotericism, while it may make use of irony, 
entails more than irony.  Again, Gadamer believes that sometimes the approach to a text as 
esoteric is well-founded but that the Straussians take this too far.  For example, in an interview 
with Ernest Fortin about Strauss, Gadamer states that he found Strauss’s reading of Maimonides 
persuasive but that “the same method did not apply equally well to Spinoza.”25  Further, this 
esotericism assumes, on Gadamer’s account, too high a standard of logic and control of the text 
by the author.  Every time there is a contradiction or a difficulty in a text does not mean that the 
author is dissembling or wishing to draw our attention to the contradiction (though it may be the 
case).  Nor, for example, is every aspect of the setting or the dramatic structure central to the 
meaning of a Platonic dialogue.26  Just as Gadamer would reject an epistemology that attempts to 
establish certainty and attain a god-like point of view, so too he resists a hermeneutics that 
assumes that the text has a god-like author.  In this same interview he says, for example, of some 
aspects of Jakob Klein’s readings of Plato, together with some of the work of the second and 
third generation Straussians, “That is Talmud in the wrong place.”27 
In regard to the consideration of the author in interpretative practice, Gadamer finds himself 
in agreement with Friedrich Schlegel who writes that “words understand each other often better 
than those who make use of them.”28  But Schlegel and the Romantics (and their latter day 
proponents like Paul de Man) go too far, for a Gadamerian hermeneutics, when they suggest, like 
Schlegel, that writing is the mistaken attempt to make reasonable that which is at bottom 
15 
 
“unconditioned whim” (“unbedingter Willkür,” [Paul de Man translates this “total 
arbitrariness”]) and the “chaos of human nature.”29  For Gadamer, as I have reiterated, the 
primary matter in the interpretation is that which is said, i.e., die Sache, not who is speaking.  
And, though, the concept of play and playfulness is important for Gadamerian hermeneutics, 
texts are not a matter of sheer play in the sense of “total arbitrariness,” for play too has its rules, 
if only unspoken ones.  Gadamer, apart from very brief comments never comes to terms with 
Romantic irony.  Gadamer does consider ‘romantic hermeneutics,’ but under this title he deals 
almost exclusively with Friedrich Schleiermacher.30  And irony is not discussed in this context, 
except with reference to Plato.  In short, I take the Gadamerian objection to Schlegel’s romantic 
irony to follow from the romantic concern for the absolute. For Schlegel and the Romantics, the 
negativity of irony shows us, if only negatively, the absolute.  Gadamer’s concern is not for the 
absolute but for coming to an understanding of what the speech is about--the matter at hand.  In 
addition, the Romantics, especially Friedrich Schlegel, expand the notion of irony too far.  All 
writing is seen to be ironic—or at least all philosophic and poetical writing.  Paradox is irony, for 
Schlegel.31  For Gadamer, who embraces dialectical thought, contradiction and paradox are not 
always ironic.  Finally, we have seen how Gadamer finds irony revealing a common 
understanding of the topic of discussion, rather than Schlegel’s ‘incomprehensibility’ 
(Unverständlichkeit).   
 
4. Irony:  The Spoken and the Written 
In the late and important essay, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” (1992) 
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Gadamer writes that irony shows us the limits of writing.32  As Gadamer points out in “Text and 
Interpretation, irony, like a joke, is, in the first place, a mode of spoken speech.  The joke or the 
ironical statement is often very difficult to understand when it becomes written and deprived of 
the living context of its utterance.  In this late essay on ritual and language, Gadamer is attending 
to the pre-linguistic and non-linguistic context for linguistic expression—gesture, facial 
expression, even action and deed.  He insists here on the primacy of the spoken over the written.   
He speaks of “the incurable defect” of writing and the fact that “all presentation fixed in writing 
is still supported by something else that is conveyed only in living conversation.”33  He mentions 
here, as we might expect, Plato’s Seventh Letter, which together with the Phaedrus, speak to the 
limits of writing.   
 But what is meant by what I have called “the primacy of the spoken” for Gadamer—what 
Gadamer calls the “originariness of the spoken” (die Ursprünglichkeit des Gesprochenen)?  He 
surely does not mean that all written speech is derivative from a prior spoken speech.  In “Text 
and Interpretation” he writes explicitly that those texts that are preeminently texts, namely, 
literary texts, do not refer back to some prior spoken speech.  They do not present us with words 
somehow ripped out of a lived speech situation.  Rather the words of these texts originate on the 
page; they are written to be read. They prescribe “all repetitions and acts of speaking.” (TI 42)  
Texts are meant for a reader.  Readers do not share the same lived context with the author.  It is 
this not being a part of the immediate lived experience of the reader that constitutes a text for 
Gadamer and why he rejects notes, letters, transcribed conversations or tape-recordings as 
genuine texts.   A challenge for the written text is to provide, to some degree, its own context.  
What I take the primacy of the spoken to mean for Gadamer is the primacy of lived experience 
which has linguistic, non-linguistic and pre-linguistic aspects.  And this primacy points to the 
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central significance, again, of die Sache, the matter at hand, for language and lived experience 
are always of something.  Here we see the “phenomenological” side of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  
In his later work Gadamer is much concerned with the limits of language and the limits of 
understanding.   For him, this concern for limits is simply the other side of the concern for the 
conditions of understanding, which is closely tied to language and which predominates in Truth 
and Method.  
The text, which is simply linguistic—that is, words on a page--may evoke lived 
experience and the limits of speech and understanding through words.  We see the priority of the 
spoken even for the text which is not derived from the spoken as Gadamer develops his account 
of the text by discussing the text’s “ideality” and the reader’s “inner ear.”(TI 43, 51)34  Gadamer 
writes:   
 Its linguistic presence as text is such as to demand repetition of the words 
in the original power of their sound—not in such a way as to reach back to some 
original speaking of them, however, but rather looking forward toward a new, 
ideal speaking. (TI 44) 
 
The text prescribes how it is to be read.  In this reading, though it be silent, we hear it in our 
“inner ear.”  In this engagement we are to be primarily concerned with what the text is about—its 
claim to truth.  Just as Plato makes clear to us, in coming to terms with the text we have to 
consider the relationship of word and deed, logos and ergon. 
 Irony is a borderline case; it shows us “the limits of writing.”  It is on the boundary, 
because, although it is primarily to be found in spoken speech, it can, with difficulty, be written.  
The best example for Gadamer of ironical writing is Plato and the ironical speech of Socrates.  
Plato is also the exemplar of irony for Schlegel and Kierkegaard.  Plato provides us with 
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conversations, that is, the spoken, but as written and, quite surely, not as notes nor as a transcript 
of a conversation but as a carefully crafted literary philosophical work.  The textuality of Plato’s 
texts is an extremely complicated matter for Gadamer—too complicated for us to adequately 
deal with it here.  Two large aspects of this complication concern, one, the distinction of 
philosophy and literature, and, two, irony.  The distinction between literature and philosophy is 
an important one for Gadamer.  Philosophy, he argues, does not provide us with “eminent” texts.  
Philosophical works, like the work of Penelope, constantly undo themselves as they find their 
place in the larger philosophical conversation.35  Yet the example of Plato’s work clearly 
challenges this distinction of literature and philosophy.  Gadamer frequently refers to his artistry.  
Secondly, not only is one of his characters, namely Socrates, ironic, but Plato’s own writing is 
ironic.  Though Gadamer refers to Plato’s use of irony fairly frequently in his two books and 
many essays on Plato (three volumes of his collected works), nowhere does Gadamer provide an 
extensive discussion of Platonic irony.  The place where he gives irony the most attention (and 
even here the remarks are quite brief) is in a very early review of the then recent research on 
Plato from 1933.  In this review essay Gadamer gives Friedländer high praise for many aspects 
of his two volumes on Plato but most of all for his treatment of irony.  Gadamer writes that 
Friedländer shows us that not only is there Socratic irony but also Plato’s artistic irony.36  
Gadamer also speaks here, following Friedländer, of Plato’s literary accomplishment:  “the most 
perfected (vollendeste) artistic accomplishment of the entire Greek literature.”(GW V, 225) 
 But how are we to understand the written and textual status of ironical texts such as those 
that Plato presents us with?  We noted above how Gadamer distinguishes between texts and 
antitexts.  He considers irony an antitext.  Taken simply and straightforwardly, this would mean 
that, in the strict sense, Plato’s writings are not to be considered texts.  In light of the 
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Gadamerian distinction between literature and philosophy, between eminent texts and non-
eminent texts, one might be led to say that for Gadamer, philosophy does not provide eminent 
texts in any case.  Thus Plato’s writings on this account alone are not texts.  But if Plato is as 
much a literary artist as he is a philosopher, his writings ask for consideration as eminent texts.  
Further, how are we to consider prominent literary texts that are ironical.  Thomas Mann, for 
example, writes with irony.  Are his writings then anti-texts and not texts?   
 It is one thing for a character in the text to speak ironically and another for the author to 
write ironically.  Inasmuch as Gadamer considers irony to be, in the first place, a matter of 
spoken speech and lived context, such irony can be presented in the dramatic situation and in the 
speeches of Socrates or one of the characters from a Mann novel.  If irony were only to be found 
in the speeches of characters, the literary text within which these speeches are to be found, need 
not be considered an anti-text.   But if the voice of the narrator or the text itself is ironical--that 
is, if Plato and Mann are ironical and not only Socrates and Adrian Leverkuhn--then the text 
itself would seem to count as an anti-text.  On Gadamer’s account, the irony of the author (and 
not merely the character) requires solidarity between the author and the reader, a cultural 
understanding between the author and the reader.  Since the author does not know his reader and 
since the reader may stand outside the immediate cultural context of the author, the irony of the 
author, that is, the irony of the text, is both risky and hopeful.   
 If we look carefully as to how Gadamer presents anti-texts, he does not, however, simply 
say that anti-texts are not texts.  He says rather that anti-texts resist textualization. (TI 37)     This 
speaks to the great difficulty of both writing and interpreting irony and to Gadamer’s statement 
that irony is an example of the limits of writing.  It does not necessarily mean that an ironical text 
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cannot be an eminent text in Gadamer’s sense.  His treatment of this speaks also to the priority of 
the spoken. 
 
5. Derrida, Strauss, and Plato 
Derrida resists not only the good will of Gadamerian hermeneutics but also, among other 
things, the priority of the spoken.  For Derrida the metaphysical tradition from Plato through 
Rousseau, Hegel and Husserl understands the written to be derivative of speech.  On his account 
this tradition treats writing is a mode of reproducing spoken discourse.  Writing is, as such, 
secondary.  But it wishes to supplant the primary, the spoken.  Writing is, accordingly, 
dangerous.  Plato inaugurates this understanding of the written, according to Derrida, with his 
“diatribe against writing” in the Phaedrus.37  Derrida proclaims the priority, rather, of writing.  
Not wishing to simply reverse a binary opposition, the opposition of the spoken and the written, 
he suggests that all linguistic expression, spoken or written, is a form of writing.38  Gadamer, as 
we have seen, would disagree.  For Gadamer, what is spoken and not written is not a form of 
writing.  What is written is not necessarily a text. Gadamer, in contrast with Derrida, does give a 
certain kind of priority to spoken discourse, but the highest form of writing, that is, the texts of 
literature and poetry, prescribe what is to be said and are not derivative from spoken discourse.  
For Gadamer, as we have seen, the priority of the spoken does not mean that a text is derived 
from or refers back to spoken speech; rather it refers forward to repetition in speech, if only for 
the inner ear.  This kind of priority Derrida does not consider. 
Plato’s Phaedrus is an important text for both Gadamer and Derrida.  For both it is a text that 
importantly defines their respective understandings of Plato and helps define their respective 
understandings of writing.  Their writing on the Phaedrus also provides a good example for us of 
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their respective approach to texts, their respective hermeneutical practice.39  Derrida’s reading of 
the Phaedrus wants to show us how Plato wishes to repress or “exclude” writing, to show writing 
as the “miserable son” of speech.  But, according to Derrida, Plato’s attempt inevitably fails.  
The trace of writing, the supplement of writing, remains and shows itself.  His interpretation 
culminates in his treatment of Socrates’ statement, late in the dialogue in the context of the 
discussion of writing, that spoken discourse is “inscribed” or “written” on the soul.  Derrida here 
says a number of things here that are telling: 
1) That Socrates is “for the first time” led to envision speech as legitimate writing; 
2) That the reader and Plato have “usually assumed” that what we are dealing with is a 
metaphor; 
3) That for Plato and for “all of Western philosophy…metaphoricity is the logic of 
contamination and the contamination of logic,”  
4) That it is “remarkable that the so-called living discourse should be suddenly described by 
a ‘metaphor’ borrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it,” 
and 
5) “Yet this borrowing is rendered necessary by that which structurally links the intelligible 
to its repetition in the copy, and the language describing dialectics cannot fail to call upon 
it.”40 
In short, the metaphor is a slip by Plato.  This metaphor, this mistake by Plato, shows us the trace 
and the supplement that cannot be repressed.  Much of Derrida’s language in the interpretive 
telling of the dialogue is in the passive voice, e.g., “Socrates is led for the first time to 
envision….”  The passive voice is indicative of the “structural necessity” of which Derrida 
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writes.  Though Plato dreams of eliminating it, it has a necessity, according to Derrida, which 
cannot be repressed.  Plato’s dream that cannot come true.  
 Two things about his reading stand out, especially in the context of our concerns here.  
First, his reading is flat and without a sense for Plato’s irony.41  In this regard he is much like 
Heidegger, on whose Plato interpretation Derrida is so much dependent.  Secondly, though 
Derrida is happy to talk about what Plato would like to do in the text and of what Plato dreams, 
Derrida does not consider Plato to be the master of his text.  There is a necessity that is operating 
in the text that surpasses Plato, the author.  Derrida understands this necessity through a kind of 
structuralist psychoanalysis.  He knows or has the key, le differance.  Plato does not know what 
he is doing, but Derrida does.  He knows better than the author. 
 Before we turn to Gadamer, we might take note of Leo Strauss’ quite different 
interpretation of the Phaedrus and Plato’s understanding of the status of writing.  We do not have 
an extended interpretation of the Phaedrus by Strauss, as we do of the Symposium or the Laws.  
What we find in Strauss, in contrast with Derrida, is a much deeper appreciation of Plato’s irony 
and playfulness.  We also find, as an interpretive principle, an assumption of the author’s 
mastery of the text.  This fits, as we noted above, with Strauss’ esoteric approach to Plato’s texts.  
Specifically, with the regard to the Phaedrus, we find a sharp contrast with Derrida’s central 
interpretive thesis.  Strauss writes that, for Plato, “writing on the highest level is higher than 
nonwriting on the highest level.”42  This claim is made in a brief comment, so perhaps we should 
not make too much of it.  But Strauss’ very brief argument on behalf of the superiority of writing 
to nonwriting, that is to oral speech, is as follows:  since Plato wrote Socrates’ critique of 
writing, it must be assumed that he regarded writing higher than nonwriting.  Implicitly Strauss 
is arguing that had Plato agreed with Socrates’ treatment of writing, Plato would have followed 
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Socrates’ example and would not have devoted so much of his life to writing. There is not so 
much a textual contradiction which shows us this as a performative contradiction—the very 
writing of the dialogue contradicts Socrates’ speech. 
 Gadamer’s position in regard to Plato and the Phaedrus is somewhere between Derrida 
and Strauss.  He would disagree with Strauss’ claim that Plato regarded writing higher than 
nonwriting.  And, as we have seen, Gadamer has reservations about the degree of mastery of the 
text by the author, even if the author is Plato.  But, nonetheless, he is clearly much closer to 
Strauss than he is to Derrida.  Gadamer would have us see how Plato ironically supports the 
positive importance of rhetoric and writing in the Phaedrus.  Plato is not trying to exclude or 
repress writing.  Metaphors are not a contaminant.  On Gadamer’s account Plato--through his 
irony, the dramatic structure of the dialogue, and the relation of word and deed--would have us 
see affirmed much of what Derrida suggests Plato unsuccessfully attempts to exclude and 
repress.  Gadamer happily acknowledges that Plato “laid the foundation for the metaphysical 
conceptuality of our tradition” but at the same time Plato “mimetically limited all his 
assertions.”43  Through his irony and what Gadamer calls his “dialogical poetry,” Plato not only 
limited his assertions but he “robbed his reader of his assumed superiority.”44  Reading Plato 
carefully, should, on Gadamer’s account, lead us to adapt the appropriate hermeneutic posture of 
humility and modesty, of which we spoke at the beginning of this paper. 
In addition, Gadamer, like Strauss, takes seriously the notion of a “hidden doctrine.”  
And, like Strauss, too, Gadamer thinks we can make some sense of this on the basis of the 
dialogues.  But unlike Strauss, Gadamer does not find this primarily motivated by politics and 
the threat to the life of the philosopher.  Rather it has more to do with the limits of writing.  For 
Gadamer,  it is not so much a matter of having a hidden doctrine as having an oral teaching.45  
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“Oral instruction,” he writes, “stands under a different law.”46  This “different law” follows from 
the continuity of what was said before and after and from the knowledge of one another in 
community.  Though Gadamer points to the harmony of the Seventh Letter with the Phaedrus in 
regard to the oral and the written, and he relies on these two texts to make his case about the oral 
teaching, he violates Plato’s prohibition in the Seventh Letter when he, Gadamer, speculates 
about the oral teaching, about which he thinks we can make some reasonable, though qualified, 
assertions based on the written tradition together with the dialogues.  But it is not for us here to 
concern ourselves further with Gadamer’s speculations about the oral teaching.  We have taken 
this into account to mark the difference of his approach to this matter with that of Strauss and to 
mark again the primacy of the spoken for Gadamer.. 
 Finally, it is important to note that Gadamer not only points out the limits of writing, but 
that he is concerned to point out as well the limits of oral speech, that is the limits of speech or 
logos as such.  In the two essays where Gadamer writes about the Seventh Letter and the 
unwritten doctrine or teaching, he argues that fundamental to Plato’s “doctrine” is Plato’s 
appreciation of “the weakness of the logoi” and “the limitedness of all human knowing.”47  All 
three of these contemporary hermeneuts—Gadamer, Derrida, and Strauss—would agree about 
our human limits, our finitude.  But Gadamer and Strauss see it as something positively 
embraced by Plato, while Derrida does not.  Derrida rather follows Nietzsche and sees in Plato 
and even in Socrates ressentiment about our human condition.48 
 Above all for Gadamer, this limit of understanding is displayed in our understanding of 
ourselves, in self-understanding.  He takes seriously Socrates’ ironic statement in the Phaedrus 
that he has yet to fulfill the injunction of the Delphic oracle:  “to know myself.”(229e)  Like his 
other ironic statements, there is a sense in which the statement is meant and a sense in which the 
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statement is not meant.  Though Socrates knows himself better than his fellow Athenians 
(witness Socrates’ self defense in the Apology), the task is an open one that can never be 
completed.  Paradoxically, our own self-understanding is best attained in dialogue with others 
about matters that concern us all. 
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